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ABSTRACT 
This article explores the way government has been managing the antagonism between 
institutional forces towards efficiency and those towards control in the international 
seaport of Lisbon. We conclude that the antagonism emerges in the presence of certain 
institutional forces, like economic downturns and political changes, that stimulate the 
adoption of new adequate templates. Governments have come to manage this 
antagonism through the separation between the strategic and operational structures, 
and by controlling strategic issues while giving operational autonomy. As such, 
organizational transformations have reflected this way to manage the antagonism. 
Given the emergence of new institutional templates (e.g. corporate governance) we also 




Due to major societal transformations that occurred in most western countries, public 
service organizations are becoming leaner (Guiddens, 1998). A mix of competitive 
pressures at the state level, and institutional pressures for the public sector organizations 
to adopt private sector templates of efficiency and resource rationality (Carter & 
Mueller, 2002; D’Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000), is boosting accelerated 
organizational change in public sector enterprises. National governments are struggling 
to manage this change in the midst of a complex set of institutional forces including 
public opinion, political party activities, professional associations, unions, and supra-
national regulatory organisms.  
In this context, many countries are implementing political and administrative reforms in 
order to cope with these external pressures, by adopting institutional arrangements in 
line with the most salient and often contradictory values, norms and rules that these 
institutional factors impose (Jones & Thompson, 1984). In many cases, these political 
reforms have generally been captured by the New Public Management approach 
(Howlett, 2004). 
Private management principles have come to achieve higher legitimacy within western 
societies, becoming the institutional template for public administration. As a result, 
there is a growing conviction that governments “are to be evaluated on results, ...work 
on quasi-market situations,...[be] agile in performance, able to adopt private sector 
administrative techniques, and [be] focused on client-citizen [needs]” (Cabrero, 2005) . 
In this way, the new public management philosophy has lent governments a myriad of 
administrative prescriptions for the public sector reform in the last twenty years. These 
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include administrative changes such as privatization, contracting-out, downsizing, 
results-based budgeting and regulatory reform, all of which represent a facet of the new 
public management rhetoric (Cabrero, 2005). With smaller budgets and precise targets, 
states are dropping out from providing public services themselves and turning to a 
regime of representative regulation, by using other control instruments like advisory 
boards or direct regulation, to govern specific sectoral relationships (Howlett, 2004). In 
sum, states have come to endorse public management in a way similar to Metcalfe´s 
(1993: 179) definition of public management as the art of “getting things done through 
other organizations”. 
Though some studies report limited impact of these reforms, finding a reproduction of 
the functionally-based organizing arrangements that existed before new public 
administration reforms have taken place (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004), others have found 
mixed results, with significant increases in public management efficiency and a growing 
client-citizen orientation (Rieder & Lehmann, 2002). They have referred to this as a 
very sensitive and important point, since the success of the new public management 
institutional template could be seen as a crucial matter for the legitimacy of the present 
reforms and for those yet to come. However, as new institutional approaches argue, the 
legitimacy of an institutional template depends more on the “underlying interpretive 
scheme” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) or “socially constructed mind” (Selznick, 
1996), rather than on objective success indicators. As Cabrero (2005) has put it: 
As new sociological institutionalism has explained, legitimacy is established through 
symbolic mechanisms and not necessarily through actions, or even less through results. 
(p. 92) 
This means that, ultimately, the adoption of a template and its consequences for the 
public sector reform depend less on the effectiveness of the implemented changes than 
on valued schemas and legitimized and isomorphic forms (Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000, Oliver, 1991). This is in accordance with Townley’s 
(2002) conception of institutionalized templates as “rationalized myths”. As she argues, 
business planning and performance measures have been taken as central to gain control 
over expenditure and bring accountability into public management, and as such, have 
gained the status of rationalized myths viewed as the route to better management. 
However, Townley (2002) has also called attention to the pluralistic character of 
institutional environments, which means that templates grounding new public 
management reforms must co-exist with other different and sometimes rival ones 
(Johnson, Smith, & Codling, 2000; Beckert, 1999). Though we can consider that there 
can be an hierarchy of templates, it is probably their inter-relationships that brings up 
the complexity of institutional environments. 
In this case, other templates related to public management may also be relevant to 
analyse public sector metamorphosis. For example, the role of governments as to 
ascertain and promote the common good and to attempt to achieve this end (Jones & 
Thompson, 1984), is another institutional template in western societies. If so, these 
templates may not only dispute a higher place in the social hierarchy, but can even 
coexist problematically and have difficulty in not obstructing each other (Cabrero, 
2005). For example, while governments may privatize a certain public service, this is 
not without some costs in terms of the control for the quality of the service. Even if 
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other measures can be put in place to control the services’ outcomes, like increasing 
sector regulation, direct control is lost. As public ownership means that all citizens of a 
community or state have legal claims on the organization’s assets and profits (D’Aunno 
et al., 2000), governments must handle certain public administration reforms in a 
difficult and multiform institutional environment. 
This raises the question of how national governments have been managing these 
antagonistic institutional forces, one calling for the need to improve public management 
efficiency, which we can name the efficiency template, and other referring to the need to 
maintain the control over public goods and services, which we may call the control 
template. This antagonism may be probably even higher in core strategic sectors for a 
nation, like the energetic, the communications or the transportation ones. 
In this article we explore the way Portuguese government have been managing the 
antagonism between the efficiency and control templates, using the case study of a 
public enterprise, Port of Lisbon Authority (PLA). The article unfolds as follows. We 
first describe the methodology, the data sources and the data analysis strategy. After, we 
describe the institutional context of PLA and its evolution in terms of major 
organizational transformations. We then discuss systematically how organizational 
forms of PLA reflect the way the Portuguese state has come to manage the antagonistic 
institutional pressures. Finally, we present the implications of our analysis to the future 
of public management. 
 
METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
To study the efficiency/control antagonism, we relied on the case study analysis of a 
Portuguese state owned enterprise in the transportation industry – Port of Lisbon 
Authority. We thought this would be the appropriate place to conduct our study for the 
following reasons. First, in-depth historical case studies are considered as useful to 
conduct exploratory research (Yin, 1984). Second, many studies have used case-study 
research in institutional contexts, in order to capture how institutional forces influence 
the behaviour of organizations (Washington, 2004; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; 
Laurila & Lilja, 2002). Third, PLA was institutionalized in 1907 (almost 100 years ago) 
and, as such, has faced different institutional contexts. Fourth, PLA has gone through a 
series of major organizational transformations and successive restructuring along its 
history. Fifth, PLA performs an important strategic function to the country. Seaports 
like PLA play a critical role in determining a nation’s competitiveness and economic 
health, given their function as trade gateways. In Europe, they represent about 90% of 
the intercontinental commercial trade (Haarymeyer & Yorke, 1993). For these reasons, 
we expected the antagonism between efficiency and control to be very high in this case. 
Data Sources 
The strategy for data collection was also guided by our own research question. As such, 
we defined three key areas to gather information. Those were (1) seaports information 
and jargon understanding; (2) information about the institutional templates and 
institutional context of PLA throughout its history; and (3) data on the sequential major 
transformations in PLA’s organizational form. 
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The need to get this diversity of information lead us to a triangulation strategy (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967) in which we collected data from multiple sources. These included an 
exhaustive consultation of archival data like planning and accountant annual reports 
(available from 1921 to 2003), strategic documentation, legal information as the laws 
defining major organic transformations of PLA, European Union directives and 
recommendations in the domain of transportation, and hard data from worldwide 
seaports activities. Archival data is an important source of information in a case study 
(Locke, 2001) and is quite appropriate if we want to track factual organizational 
evolution. It has been used extensively in studies analysing institutional issues 
(McNulty & Ferlie, 2004; D’Aunno et al., 2000; Deephouse, 1996). 
We also interviewed two key persons of PLA (who were at the organization for more 
than 10 years). These were the Head of the Department of Studies and Planning and the 
Responsible for the Documentary Archive of PLA. In addition to the access to the 
organization and documentation, these interviews were important because: first, they 
could give us a framework to analyse the evolution of PLA, even if it was their own 
view; and second, their comments and information was fundamental in guiding our 
collection of archival data. It helped us to set up some priorities in the myriad of 
information that we could select. For this purpose, following the strategy of others (e.g. 
Rindova & Kotha, 2001), we also consulted various books related to the history of PLA 
and with the historical context of its development. 
 
Data Analysis Strategy 
In our inductive approach to understand how governments have come to deal with the 
efficiency/control antagonism we engaged in a continuous comparison process between 
theories we were developing and the data, which drove a recurrent re-examination of 
data and  revision on our explanatory theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). This occurred in a 
very iterative fashion as we were producing and analysing a growing number of memos 
with important analytical value (Locke, 2001). 
As we conducted our historical analysis, we felt like a detective struggling to pick up 
multiple evidence in a convergent manner in order to come across with some consistent 
response to our problem (Yin, 1984). An example was the hypothesis that successive 
ideologically different governments have come to give privilege to one or another 
institutional force, an hypothesis which emerged as we conducted the chronological 
analysis. We thought this was a viable way to look at this data because there is a strong 
empirical correspondence between socialism (and thus socialist governments) and 
power of the state and capacity to resist privatization (Carroll, Goodstein, & Gyenes, 
1988). However, since we could not get consistent data to support this efficiency vs 
control political character, we had to move further for other stronger explanations. 
It was then that we decided to deploy the sequence of events anchored not by an 
institutional criteria but by the major formal transformations that occurred in the 
structure of PLA. Newman (2000: 603) has defined organizational transformation as the 
“intra-organizational change that leaves the organization better able to compete 
effectively in its competitive milieu”. In a public company, organizational 
transformations may be seen as changes in the organizational form in order to become 
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isomorphic with legitimized institutional templates. This is the definition of 
organizational transformation we adopt here. 
Based on dates and periods of time that PLA has gone under formal organizational 
transformation, we characterized organizational changes and related them with relevant 
institutional facts occurring within those same periods of time. With this analytical 
strategy we were able to set a consistent sequence of events and rule out contingent 
relationships that were quite straightforward to answer our research question. 
Our recollection of the main institutional forces influencing PLA since 1907 was driven 
by the analysis of archival materials. Especially important for the identification of the 
major institutional contextual features were Board Presidents’ messages in the Annual 
Reports. All this information gave us the opportunity to identify key institutional forces 
influencing PLA and to make inferences about which institutional templates have 
emerged throughout the five periods we considered in the analysis. The deployment of 
these institutional forces into five analytical periods allowed us to make inferences on 
the relationship between the institutional contexts and organizational transformations. 
All the analytical process was followed by two of the authors working individually in a 
way that, after completing the successive intermediate analysis, case histories were 
compared in order to guarantee construct validity (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 
THE CASE OF PORT OF LISBON ADMINISTRATION 
In this section we describe the results of our analysis of the PLA case. Major 
transformations in PLA have occurred by governments’ legislative initiative. These 
changes in the organizational form of PLA happened in four landmarks since its 
foundation in 1907: 1934, 1948, 1987 and 1998. As such, up to our days, PLA has 
assumed five different organizational forms constituted by different structures. We took 
them as key evolutionary periods, following the procedures of previous authors 
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Institutional landmarks in PLA evolution periods 
Periods Name Institutional Context 
1907-1934 Lisbon Port 
- Port of Lisbon Administration is Born (1907). 
- Fall of the Monarchy (1910). 
- First Portuguese Republic (1910-1926). 
- World War I (Portuguese participation in the Allies). 
- Military Dictatorship (1926-1932). 





- New State Governance (1932-1974). 
- World War II (Portuguese neutrality). 





- Portuguese colonial war in Africa (1961-1974). 
- First Oil Crisis (1974). 
- Democracy implementation (1974). 
- Second Oil Crisis (1979). 
- Central Coalition government (1983-1985). 
- Third Oil Crisis (mid 1980’s). 
- Portugal enter the European Economic Community (1986). 
- Center-right government (1985-1995). 
1987-1998 
Port of Lisbon 
Administration, 
Public Institute 
- Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). 
- EU White Paper on “Sustainable Mobility” (1992). 
- EU enlargement to 15 Countries (1995). 
- Asiatic crisis (1997). 
- Center-left government (1995-2001). 
1998-2005 
Port of Lisbon 
Administration, 
Anonym Society 
- Euro introduction (new currency). 
- September, 11 (2001). 
- EU enlargement to 25 Countries (2004). 
- Center-right coalition government (2002-2005). 
- China enters the World Trade Organization (2005). 
- Center-left government (2005). 
 
According to our methodology and in order to better explore the research question, we 
present the data structured by the periods of time identified according to formal 
moments of structural change. Within each period, we first characterize the main 
institutional forces that relate to the organizational transformation of PLA (Figure 1). 
Then we deploy the major organizational transformations of PLA and the main 
institutional forces that relate to the organizational transformation of PLA (Figure 2). 
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PLA evolution periods and organizational transformations 
in name, structure, and the rhetoric for change 
Periods Name Structure Rhetoric for Change 
1907-1934 Port of Lisbon 
Board: president, custom-house director, maritime 
centre department chief, chamber of commerce 
representative, navigation firms rep., railway rep., 
exploration director engineer 
“Any port should have an 
autonomous administration” 
1934-1948 
Port of Lisbon 
General 
Administration 
Board: general administrator, port director 
engineer, state accountant rep., hydraulic and 
electric rep., expert in economic issues 
General Administrator 
Port Director Engineer 
Consultative Council: board president , port 
director, LP area municipalities reps., hydraulic and 
electric rep., Lisbon custom-house rep., maritime 
centre department chief, firms and navigation 
agencies reps., fisheries rep., information, tourism 
rep., roads rep., railway rep., chamber of commerce 
and agricultural associations reps., ministries reps. 
“the principle of independence 
of port services” 
“Give to the administration the 




“Port administration should 
represent government thought” 
 
1948-1987 
Port of Lisbon 
General 
Administration 
Board: president and three members (with vote); 
state accountant rep., Navy rep., custom-house 
general direction rep. (with no vote) 
Technical Commission: board president, general 
director, and directors of the administrative, 
financial, exploratory, industrial, and equipment 
services 
Consultative Council: board president, port of 
Lisbon area municipalities reps., Lisbon custom-
house rep., port of Lisbon captain, firms and 
navigation agencies reps., fisheries rep., 
information, popular culture and tourism rep., roads 
rep., railway rep., importation and exportation 
chamber rep. (chosen by the Ministry of Economy), 
other ministries reps. 
General Director 
“Extended responsibilities for 
the Port Director, which is 
raised to the level of General 
Director” 
“The government stilled 
thinking that the port 




Port of Lisbon 
Administration, 
Public Institute 
Board: president and four members chosen by 
prime-minister, the minister of finances and the 
minister of the sea 
Fiscal Commission: president and two members 
chosen by the minister of finances, the minister of 
the sea. One member chosen by PLA employees. 
Consultative Council: board president, tourism rep., 
territory planning rep., national institute for ports 
and coasts rep., environmental issues rep., nature 
conservation rep., Lisbon custom-house rep., port 
of Lisbon captaincy rep., commercial navy rep., 
natural resources rep., fisheries rep., roads rep., 
railway rep., port of Lisbon area municipalities 
reps., navigation agents rep., port operators rep., 
commerce and industrial associations reps., 
employees union reps., local fishery union reps.,... 
“an increase in productivity” 
“Members of the board with  
public manager status” 
“government establishes 
responsibilities at the 
organizational level” 
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THE LISBON PORT: 1907-1934 
Institutional Context 
Almost immediately after PLA was born, Portugal turned to a republican system.  The 
democratic regime that followed lasted for as much as 16 years. These were turbulent 
political times, with so many governments (about 45 in the 16 years), some of which 
lasted for only weeks. The economic crisis and the insecurity climate that were the rule, 
ended with a military blow in May, 1926. Then a military dictatorship was instituted 
until 1932. In between, Portugal has actively participated in the World War I with an 
army of about 30,000 soldiers. 
In 1932 a new political regime was instituted by Oliveira Salazar who became the 
President of the Ministries Council. He called this new political order the “New State”. 
A set of measures and policies were then implemented to bring economic prosperity and 
security for the country. At an international level, economy was affected by world war 
and by the great economic depression of the 1930’s which caused an economic 
downturn in countries worldwide. In 1934, two years after the “New State” had been 
instituted, PLA suffered its first major transformation. 
Organizational Trnsformations 
PLA was the first port in Europe to be constituted as a separate organization in 1907. 
This event was coincident with the authorization given from the King D. Carlos I, king 
of Portugal, to the government to explore the port of Lisbon. The law instituting the 
organization explicitly stated that it is given “the management of the respective services 
to a board, under the immediate authority of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and 
Public Construction”. We can find as a reification of the reason to change that, given the 
emergent technological advances (e.g. the wood was substituted by steel and iron, and 
little boats for much bigger ones) and the end of a private concession for the port 
exploitation, the port should now have an “autonomous administration”. 
The board was constituted by a President, with the other board members being 
representatives of other stakeholders or organizations with which the port have close 
and interdependent activities (Figure 1). This was, respectively, the case of the chamber 
of commerce and the railway representatives. An Exploration Director Engineer was 
1998-2005 
Port of Lisbon 
Administration, 
Anonym Society 
General Assembly: ministry of finances and 
ministry of sea reps. (with vote), board members 
and unique controller (with no vote) 
Board: President and four members 
Unique Controller 
Port Coordination Commission: board rep., 
captaincy rep., ministry of equipment rep. 
“Clarify the role of state and 
private initiative” 
“exclusive public capital” 
“send to Finance Minister 
and Equipment Minister the 
Annual Report” 
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also a member of the board. This last member was responsible for a part of the 
administrative management, including preparation of the issues to be discussed in the 
board meetings. 
The board was the single internal structure, playing both the role of administration and 
that of operational management. In fact these were non-separated roles as its function 
was to explore the port and manage its inherent activities. The role of the administration 
was thus to manage taxation for those who used the port services or equipment, 
especially the foreign and bigger boats, as well as to define the equipment needs and 
propose to the government a set of measures to improve port functioning. As such, its 
mission was to progressively improve port conditions with proper funding. The board 
president could, up to a limited amount, decide some investments. Above that limit, 
superior ministerial approval was necessary. 
 
LISBON PORT GENERAL ADMINISTRATION: 1934-1948 
Institutional Context 
During the 1930’s, totalitarian regimes were flourishing all over the Europe. This came 
to an end with the occurrence of world war II in 1939. Portugal declared neutrality in 
the war. However, Portugal could not escape the negative effects in the economy. In the 
years immediately subsequent to the war, Portugal faced a major economic downturn. 
In the 1948 report introduction, the President of the Board of PLA wrote: 
In the middle of the crisis the world is living, it would be a miracle if the port of Lisbon 
could escape. 
And he continued: 
In the presence of such a fall on incomes (...) and the impossibility to create 
immediately new sources to increase it, there is only one way to act: to compress the 
expenses until the limit we effectively receive. 
At this very same year, 1948, the second major organizational transformation was 
carried out. 
Organizational Transformations 
The first major transformation in the organizational form of PLA came only in 1934. Its 
depth can probably best be captured in the name of the organization which had 
meanwhile changed to Lisbon Port General Administration (PLGA). Three new 
structures were created: the Port Director, which was responsible for the port technical 
exploitation and rigging; the Consultative Council, which had a consultative character 
only, and the figure of the General Administrator itself, which was a consequence of a 
new definition of board membership. Besides the President, the board was now 
constituted by others (see Figure 1). As a whole, the structure was explicitly and clearly 
broken into its operational, administrative, consultative and strategic functions. 
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This was based on the “principle of independence of port services”, but always 
remembering that “port administration should represent government thought”. In line 
with this, although the investment budget until which PLGA could make autonomous 
decision-making was raised considerably, higher investments still depended on 
ministerial approval. Within these limits, a relatively high degree of discretionary 
behaviour increased for the board and other structures. 
 
LISBON PORT GENERAL ADMINISTRATION: 1948-1987 
Institutional Context 
After World War II, Portugal continued submerged in the normality of the “New State” 
regime (especially as a result of Portuguese neutrality in the war). But in 1961 the 
country entered into an overseas war with independence armed movements in its 
African colonies (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau). This was important to PLA 
because, given the role this seaport played during the colonial war as a fundamental 
means to transport troops and machinery, it acted as an institutional force. However, 
this influence was for stability as its economic and strategic situations had then 
increased. 
The war overseas lasted until 1974 when the regime has fallen and a free democracy 
was instituted in Portugal. This period was also marked by the world economic  
instability provoked by the oil crisis of the 1970’s. Although the 1974 political 
turnaround can be characterized as a peacefull revolution, transition to free democracy 
was a turbulent period in which center-left and center-right parties even had to join to 
form a central coalition block in order to rule out the communists. 
As the economic crisis continued up to the 1980s (given the third oil crisis), the country 
came to reach a stable government only in 1985 with the center-right Social Democratic 
Party winning alone the majority of the parliament. Stability, both social, political and 
economic, was also a requirement for Portugal to enter the European Economic 
Community (EEC), which came to happen in 1986. The entry into the EEC brought new 
rules to the Portuguese ports, namely in issues as the principle of free maritime traffic 
services, the compliance with the free market rules, and free access to oceanic traffic 
from other countries in the community. 
Two years after the beginning of political government stability  and one year after the 
Portuguese entry into the EEC, the next major transformation was made in PLA which 
turned it into a public institute. 
Organizational Transformations 
A second major change in the form of PLA was implemented with the law number 
36:976, enacted in 1948. According to this law, the Port Director was raised to the 
position of General Director and assumed the operational management with a high 
increase in decision-making. He could now propose to the board measures and 
construction projects to increase the quality of port services. The new General Manager 
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could also authorize costs up to a certain level and could even take many decisions on 
suppliers. With this organizational transformation more operationally autonomy was 
attributed to this position. This was accompanied with the drop out of the General 
Manager from the Board. As such, a clear distinction was now effective between the 
administrative/operational function and the administration/strategic function. 
Another change was the creation of a Technical Commission to study technical and 
exploitation problems, though it had a consultative character only. The Consultative 
Council was maintained with the role of being consulted in the issues of taxation, 
regulation and other matters important for the stakeholders. In fact, the number of its 
members was raised as can be seen in Figure 1. The board stilled in the dependency of 
the government whenever their decisions involved budget investments of a considerable 
amount, but autonomy had increased and its function was now essentially strategic 
rather than operational. 
 
PORT OF LISBON ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC INSTITUTE: 1987-1998 
Institutional Context 
After the Portuguese entry into the EEC in 1986, major European political and 
economic events occurred. Since the fall of the Berlim Wall in 1989, Europe has come 
to witness the drop of many other barriers and the European Union (EU), the successor 
of EEC, has enlarged its borders to include Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. 
Common policies development have come to constitute the core of EU activity and thus 
to strongly influence national politics and decision-making. In 1992, the EU launched 
the white paper on “Sustainable Mobility”. The aim of the report was to establish a 
trans-European network through the integration of transport systems which would also 
be more protective for the environment, safer for individuals, and had more social 
safeguards for employees in the sector. The need for a white paper was justified by the 
growing transport saturation, the imbalance on the distribution of traffic between the 
different modes of transportation and an increase in the damage to the environment, 
particularly due to the rise in road traffic and consequent pollution. The EU policies 
acted as institutional forces to PLA as the need to resource rationalization and efficiency 
of seaports became very salient (especially to fight more pollutant truck transportation). 
In 1995, Portugal turned politically to the left, with the center-left government being 
supported by a minority in the parliament. Even though, the Socialist Party government 
was able to give continuity to the privatization policy initiated by its predecessor center-
right  government. This was also true for the port of Lisbon. Privatization of operations, 
mainly through concessions, got further and, in 1998 PLA has come to engage in its last 
major transformation until today. 
Organizational Transformations 
In 1987 the PLA changed its name once more to Port of Lisbon Administration, the 
name that remained to our days. And it was more than a label change. Guided by the 
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need to “increase productivity” of the port, the government transformed PLA into a 
Public Institute. Following a series of similar transformations in other areas of 
Portuguese public administration, PLA become a legally independent organization with 
administrative, financial and patrimonial autonomy. Although similarly to all previous 
organizational forms the board members were chosen by the government, the board had 
now more formal and legal autonomy to pursue its mission. They continued to need 
budget and accountant report approval, but this was all they depended from the 
government. Concession and licensing decisions, for example, were now possible 
without governmental involvement. Given the privatization through concession of most 
operational functions, PLA was transformed in a quasi-administration-only public 
organization, with relatively few operational work remaining. 
Top internal structures were reduced to three: the Board, a Fiscal Commission, and a 
Consultative Council. While the Fiscal Commission was responsible for the 
examination of the port accountancy, Consultative Council maintained its previous 
attributions. This last structure swelled even more, with new stakeholders like 
employees and port operators being represented. In the whole, this was a real major 
transformation, with the government establishing only responsibilities at the 
organizational level. However, the internal structures were essentially controlled by 
those that were decided by the government ministries. 
 
PORT OF LISBON ADMINISTRATION, ANONYM SOCIETY: 1998-2005 
Institutional Context 
Since 1998, PLA did not register any major transformational change. Its institutional 
context, however, have changed considerably. The adherence in 1998 to the founding 
group of countries of the Euro (€), brought with it the requiring convergence criteria, 
namely, price stability and tight control over the public budget deficit and public debt. 
These criteria rose the pressure for Portuguese governments to increase efficiency in 
public management. 
But private markets also suffered severe changes. First with the EU enlargement to the 
Eastern countries, and then with the entry of China in the World Trade Organization, the 
need for productivity improvement became even more salient. Efficiency and resource 
rationalization transformed into the telos for virtually all economic and social activity. 
Internationally, the world was confronted with the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As western 
democratic states “discovered” that they were not invulnerable to attacks, they 
strengthened the control over security. 
In the political realm, Portugal has witnessed turbulence. With the voluntary dismissal 
of the prime-minister in 2001, a center-right coalition government was in power for 
about three years until its dismissal by the Republic President. As the result of the last 
election in 2005 gave a parliamentary majority to the center-right Socialist Party, some 
political stability has returned to the country. 
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The last major transformation in PLA took place in 1998. Due to the need to “clarify the 
role of the state and that of the private initiative”, PLA was transformed into a Anonym 
Society, with a General Assembly a Board and a Port Coordination Commission. As an 
enterprise managed by the general code of Anonym Societies (the same as for the 
private enterprises), the shareholders General Assembly and the Board function as any 
other private Anonym Society. The Port Coordination Commission has the role of 
submit its opinion on matters as navigation security and maritime signalling. It is 
composed by a President (a representative of the board) and two other members, one 
representing the Port Captaincy and another chosen by the Equipment Minister. 
Traditional stakeholders usually participating in a Consultative Council have no more a 
role in the structure of PLA. 
By turning into a Anonym Society, PLA had to adopt private sector accountancy rules. 
However, it has exclusive public capital, the only shareholder – the state – being 
represented in the General Assembly by a representative co-jointly chosen by the 
Ministries of Finances and that responsible for the ports. Thus, PLA does not depend 
directly from the government and has attained its highest level of independence and 
autonomy ever. Neither its budget or report are anymore sent to approval for any 
Ministry (though they are necessarily reported, it is not for direct approval). However, it 
is the government that represents the only shareholder of PLA. 
Though PLA still have some operational managerial responsibilities, as in the issues 
related to nautical activities (e.g. recreation seamanship, nautical tourism) and tourism 
cruise ships, its core activities are now focused on the economic exploitation, 
conservation and development of the Lisbon port, including the management of licences 
and concessions, authorization and regulation of public construction or repairing 
equipment on ground or in sea, loans and other financial operations and security issues 
within the borders of its administration zone. The operational function is thus becoming 
even shorter than before. 
 
HOW GOVERNMENTS HAVE MANAGED ANTAGONISM: INSTITUTIONAL 
FORCES AS DRIVERS 
The rich history of PLA revealed that the choice of this organization to study our 
research problem was appropriate. Not only the results allow us to set a possible 
explanation for how governments have been managing the efficacy/control antagonism, 
but they also indicate some major institutional forces as being important drivers of 
organizational transformation in PLA. 
Some patterns emerged from the results analysis. The first was the continuous increase 
in the organization’s operational autonomy and independence from the central 
government. From each period onwards the Board of PLA has sequentially gained 
higher autonomy which was accentuated after its 1987 independent juridical status 
where its unique dependence from central government became the approved budget and 
report. This is far distict from the dependency from central government to approve 
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specific managerial decisions that was present in the first periods. This reveals that the 
NPM philosophical praise for higher local autonomy and managerial discretionary 
behaviour (Rieder & Lehman, 2002), was institutionalized through all the phases PLA 
has crossed. 
However, this autonomy was just apparent, as it was accompanied by a maintenance or 
even an increase in strategic control from the government over PLA. In fact, as Board 
members were ever since chosen by government members, strategic compliance with 
governmental thought has been secured. Even in its latest form, as state keeps assuming 
the single role of unique shareholder, PLA’s Board is under total governmental control. 
This is in accordance with previous work on NPM that has confirmed that governmental 
reforms are being implemented because “politicians desire more control over the 
professionals that dominate public services whilst, simultaneously, wanting to make 
them more responsible for outcomes” (Llwellyn & Tappin, 2003: 955). Research has 
confirmed that through the rhetoric of managerialism and performance management, the 
NPM restructuring has strengthen the vertical lines of report in many public 
organizations (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996). 
Our case study confirms these previous assertions and goes further by proposing that 
this results from the process by which governments have come to deal with the 
antagonistic template of efficiency and control. As our analysis reveals, a second major 
pattern we captured was the continuous separation between administration and 
operations. This was evident by the exclusion of the Port Director from the Board in the 
1948 transformation. It became even more explicit as PLA started its privatization 
process (mainly through concession) and progressively lost its operational functions and 
human resources. Some see the split between operational and strategic control as 
fundamental to the public sector reform (Llwellyn & Tappin, 2003: 955). Others, 
however, consider it as resulting from the action of antagonistic forces. As Scott (1995) 
has pointed out: 
The emergence of separate organizational functions within a firm can in itself be 
considered a reaction to contradictory institutional and competitive pressures. (p. 574) 
Our data is congruent with the existence of such contradictory pressures. The data from 
institutional context of PLA offers us an analysis of the institutional templates since 
1907. We found two major patterns in our analysis of the institutional forces that relate 
to organizational transformations. First, organizational transformation has occurred after 
major international economic crisis or after a high increase in competition. Second, 
organizational transformation was timely subsequent to political transformation 
(although not related to political ideology). The first set of institutional forces elicits the 
emergence of the efficiency template, while the second promotes the emergence of the 
control template. As our data supports, organizational transformation in PLA follows 
the happening of events that act as institutional forces that influence the simultaneous 
emergence of the efficiency and control templates. 
We can not establish with certainty a direct influence between economic crisis and PLA 
transformation, but we have strong reasons to believe it exists. Data shows that PLA 
transformation in 1934 was preceded by the 1930’s deep economic crisis, 1948 
transformation was implemented right after the World War II (in a downturn of Lisbon 
port activity), 1987 transformation after the oil crisis of the 1970’s and 1980’s and the 
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expansion of the free trade (east opens to west in Europe, Portuguese entry in European 
Union), and the 1998 transformation after the expectancy of the enlargement of the 
European Union and the emergence of an intensely competitive market. This is 
congruent with existing research focusing economic and societal crisis as a requisite for 
template change (Greening & Gray, 1994). 
Some authors have argued for a clear distinction between market and institutional 
pressures (Tsoukas & Papoulias, 2005; Laurila & Lilja, 2002), while others have 
verified that economic downturns can act as a strong institutional force to innovation 
and change (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Our data supports the second thesis. Whether 
because economic downturns and competitive pressures directly influence 
organizational transformation or because they act indirectly by producing a template for 
efficiency (through a valuation of competitiveness in society), the fact is that economic 
events seem to act as an institutional force towards innovation and organizational 
transformation. As such, we do not intend to sustain that market forces directly drove 
organizational transformation in public sector organizations, but we argue that at least 
they set up an institutional environment that facilitates the emergence of an efficiency 
template that strongly influenced PLA transformation. 
The other pattern we found was that organizational transformation was related to 
political transformation. The 1934 transformation was carried on two years after the 
beginning of the New State; the 1987 transformation following the 1985 center-right 
government victory; and the 1998 transformation, following the victory of center-left 
government in 1995. 
We see this as a need for a new government to gain control over public sector 
organizations as well as a mean to use PLA as a strategic asset to launch national 
economic improvement. Political change has been pointed as a major institutional 
pressure in public sector organizations (Tsoukas & Papoulias, 2005). However, the 
efficiency template has become so influential, that we could not establish a relationship 
between government ideology and predominance of state control template. Even in the 
socialist government period (1995-2001), a party whose ideology should promote state 
ownership and control (Whitley & Czaban, 1998), government engaged in continued 
privatization and continuous separation between the strategic and the operational 
function. 
At a first glance, this seems congruent with the idea that competitive pressures often set 
aside institutional ones (Oliver, 1997). However, as we have seen, one might doubt if 
the state is actually loosing control over PLA or even operational control at a certain 
level (since PLA is fully owned by the state and taxation/regulation is still a 
responsibility of PLA). 
In sum, our data suggests that, subject to major institutional pressures, PLA has been 
influenced by an institutional environment which has simultaneously accentuated two 
antagonistic institutional templates – the efficiency template and the control template. 
Governments have come to manage this phenomena by undertaking organizational 
transformations where the separation between operational and strategic functions were 
increasing. This allowed for simultaneously responding to the need to stay isomorphic 
with both the efficiency template and the control template. This was a process of 
institutionalization where components of formal structure become accepted as 
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appropriate and necessary (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983), as legitimate institutional 
templates rise within the context of PLA. By understanding governmental strategies 
along PLA history and the institutional forces they were influenced by, we are now in a 
position to anticipate (or create) possible transformations to implement in the times to 
come. 
 
WHERE NOW FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION? 
In this section, we engage in an analytical generalization (Yin, 1984) from our 
discussion on PLA to other public sector organizations, especially for those of higher 
strategic value for a nation, as the transportation sector. By increasing its strategic 
control over public sector organizations and leaving its operational component with 
relatively discretionary power, Portuguese government has been able to overcome the 
efficiency/control antagonism. However, given the growing economic competitive 
escalation and the growing pressure public opinion is exerting on politicians (Giddens, 
2003), a rise in the importance of these two institutional templates are probably to go 
further. This would lead governments to continue organizational transformations in 
order to totally free public administration from operational intervention. Many public 
sector organizations, like PLA, still have operational activity. 
However, some have seen the mission of NPM as more than the building of less 
expensive and more efficient governments (Cabrero, 2005). In effect, besides the 
efficiency template with its process modernization and market-orientation goals, NPM 
“hides” other dimensions. A good amount of studies are now debating the challenges of 
public governance (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Kickert, 1997). Governance norms 
are those that “specify control of complex organizations” (D’Aunno et al., 2000), like 
the majority of public sector organizations. These are organizations caught in the middle 
of multiple conflicting stakeholders. This reinforces even more the need to implement 
organizational transformations in order to assure transparency and participation to every 
relevant stakeholder. 
PLA is an obvious illustration. In its actual organizational form, PLA has set aside 
traditional stakeholders that participated in Consultative Councils. This was much in 
accordance with the need for efficiency gains and higher control, guiding the 1998 
transformation. But a raise in the importance of democratic management – the corporate 
governance template – might get in contradiction with this option. As relevant 
stakeholders in PLA, like navigation or operations firms’ representatives are left out of 
the discussion on issues such as taxation or port security, the current organizational 
form will become misaligned with the emerging template of corporate governance. If 
they are left pretty much out of control on issues which are at the core of their 
management activities (e.g. port taxation), how can they act in order to improve their 
competitiveness? Where is their discretionary behaviour supposed to be present in the 
private sector organizations? 
The corporate governance template is even more important in times of economic crisis 
like those the country is living now, because they pose threats to organizational form 
legitimacy and generate institutional pressures from stakeholders (Greening & Gray, 
1994). As these authors have put it: 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 8   ·  Issue 1  ·  2007  ·  © International Public Management Network 
49 
 
Following a crisis (...) stakeholders generate demands for accountability and retribution (...). Affected 
stakeholders pressure other institutions to take actions to force firms that have experienced crisis to make 
structural changes (Greening & Gray, 1994: 477). 
In a crisis scenario, the emergence of new legitimate institutional templates – like the 
corporate governance template – will result in organizational transformation (Sherer & 
Lee, 2002). This means that PLA may be waiting for new transformations in near 
future. 
The spreading of boards throughout public organizations in the end of the 19
th
 century 
and beginning of the 20
th
 century reflected the spirit that boards and commissions were 
an intelligent way to make the public sector more democratic and competent (Mitchell, 
1997). Within boards, many possible viewpoints are to be represented. This has direct 
implications for the PLA and other public organizations’ boards, since governments are 
looking to these boards exclusively in a principal-agent viewpoint, with the board 
(agent) representing the interests of the principal (government) (Brooks, 2002). This 
limited role of public organizations’ boards excludes the input of other relevant 
stakeholders and reduces the clarity of policy development and decision-making, not 
guaranteeing that boards are not acting to serve particular political, social, economic, or 
bureaucratic interests instead of representing public interest. Research has shown 
evidence that whether by increasing the number of board members (Mitchell, 1997) or 
by creating advisory boards (McShane & Krause, 1995), higher accountability can be 
achieved for those being members of a board (Sahlman, 1990). However, as this study 
demonstrates, governments will be cautious to integrate these emerging institutional 
templates into those of efficiency and control, which will certainly result in new and 
innovative forms for public organizations. 
This is of the most importance because corporate governance measures can directly 
contribute to efficiency improvement. The port of Singapore, for example, recently lost 
Maersk  Sealand and Evergreen Marine (two of the major global transhipment 
operators) to the Port of Tanjung Pelepa, in Malaysia, after several years of market 
leadership in the Asian seaports. This was due to the fact that the Malaysian government 
has offered these operators “a say in the managing of the Port” (Gordon, Lee, & Lucas, 
2004: 85). 
For all of this, we think the debate about the function of boards in strategic public sector 
enterprises, specifically the limits of board members’ discretionary behaviour (Child, 
1997), will become a major topic in public management studies. Challenges are coming 
to public sector administration in order to understand how to best manage the 
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The goal of this case study is to understand the way Portuguese governments have been 
managing the antagonism between the template of efficiency and the template of 
control. We met our goal by analysing the case study of a Portuguese state owned 
enterprise, PLA. 
Based on our analysis we have reason to conclude that governments are responding to 
antagonistic institutional forces by engendering organizational forms that clearly 
separate the strategic from the operational dimension. Furthermore, at least for PLA, the 
government is cutting operational costs through privatization (including concessions) 
and reinforcing its strategic control over the organization. With this strategy, 
governments have been able to overcome the antagonism between the efficiency and 
control templates. 
Given the emergent template of corporate governance, however, governments will soon 
possibly be confronted with the need to incorporate new values into organizational 
forms of the public sector. Public governance may require from governments the need 
to restructure its controlling mechanisms, allowing for higher participation from key 
stakeholders. 
In conclusion, this article offers four major contributions to the field of public 
management. First, it explores the way organizations respond in the long run to 
antagonistic institutional templates, namely the efficiency and the control templates, 
presenting a strategy adopted for a public sector organization while it strives to 
overcome those contradictory forces. Second, we brought together two different kinds 
of literature – NPM and institutional theory – not often taken in conjunction to analyse 
public sector reforms. This is an important limitation since, given their particular nature, 
public organizations are more responsive than private organizations to changes in 
institutional environment (Casile & Blake, 2002). Third, although carefully, the 
conclusions of this study may be extensive to other public sector organizations in the 
transportation sector, and maybe in other areas of public management. Although 
conducted within a Portuguese organization, we believe many other countries are facing 
similar problems and challenges. 
This study also has several limitations. First, the institutional forces identified are 
necessarily the result of a biased analysis. Other institutional influences might have 
been considered in our analysis. We tried to deal with this by increasing the reliability 
of our interpretation. For that reason, besides coming with the institutional forces 
directly from the documents we checked them with knowledgeable people from within 
the organization. Although we acknowledge both the institutional context we outline 
and its relationship with PLA organizational transformation are but a possible 
interpretation of this institution’s change process, we pushed hard to make it a good 
one. Reliability can be enhanced with future studies analysing other types of 
information sources (e.g. interviewing past board director) and organizations with 
similar institutional environments. 
Another limitation is the fact that we have not analysed financial data. This was because 
the objective of the study – understand how government has been managing the 
antagonism between institutional pressures for efficiency and for control – did not 
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directly required the analysis of this data. However, financial data is available and may 
help us identify the role non-institutional/market forces played in the history of PLA. 
Furthermore, there may be interrelated relationships between institutional and market 
influences that may come to reveal from interest and relevance, both theoretically and 
for practice. Future studies should also approach these questions. 
Finally, we do not conclude with a clear preview of how PLA will evolve from now on. 
We nonetheless identified major institutional forces and templates that will probably 
shape the future organizational architecture of PLA. It will most probably have to 
enhance other stakeholders’ participation in strategic decisions of the port. This might 
bring together the three templates of governance, efficiency and public good, as proved 
by the Tanjung Pelepa’s Port in Malaysia 
Perhaps our major contribution is to uncover a possible challenge for the public sector 
management in the years ahead. The emergence of other relevant templates will 
underscore the need to develop new organizational forms to integrate contradictory 
values and goals where governments may recognize that sometimes tradeoffs are 
necessary, i.e., to give up something so as not to give up everything.  
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